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ABSTRACT 
Probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) play an increasingly important role in the regulatory 
framework of the U.S. nuclear power industry.  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) relies 
on a set of plant-specific Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models to provide critical risk-
based input to the regulatory process.  The Significance Determination Process (SDP), 
Management Directive 8.3 - NRC Incident Investigation Program, Accident Sequence Precursor 
(ASP) and Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) programs are among the regulatory 
initiatives that receive significant input from the SPAR models.  Other uses of the SPAR models 
include: Screening & Resolution of Generic Safety Issues, License Amendment reviews and 
Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOEDs). This paper presents the current status of SPAR model 
development activities, future development objectives, and issues related to the development, 
verification and maintenance of the SPAR models. 
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models are a set of 76 linked fault tree/event 
tree probabilistic risk models used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to evaluate the 
risk of operations at all 104 U.S. nuclear power plants. The SPAR model development program 
was originated in 1995 primarily to support NRC’s Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) program.  
The models, quantification code (SAPHIRE [1]), primary data source [2] and the human 
reliability analysis (HRA) methodology [3] were all developed at the Idaho National Laboratory 
(INL).
NRC’s transition to risk informed decision making, as well as advances in probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) methods, has necessitated many enhancements to the SPAR models.  These 
models have evolved from crude order of magnitude approximations to detailed models yielding 
results comparable with utility PRA models. Figure 1 illustrates the history of the SPAR model 
development as well as the feedback mechanisms used to facilitate ongoing model modifications.  
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Rev. 1 Models
1995 – 1998
Rev. 2/2QA Models
1998 - 2001
Rev. 3i Models
Completed 11/02
Rev. 3 Models
Completed 12/04
Rev. 3.4x Models
In progress
•Developed from “Daily Events Manual”
•Train level system modeling
•Limited number of event trees
•Expanded modeling of event trees and front 
line systems based on NRC reviewed IPEs
•Detailed external review by Sandia NL
SPAR Level 1 Model Development
•Expanded number of event trees
•Support system fault trees/initiators added
•SDP plant visit comments incorporated
•Detailed reviews
•Data updated and templates generated
•RCP seal LOCA and LOOP models updated
•Detailed cut set level review against PRAs
•Model documentation expanded/updated
•Feedback from ~50 ASP
analyses per year
•Feedback from emergent 
SDP analyses
•Peer reviews from licensees 
(ASP/SDP analyses; MSPI
reviews)
•Incorporation of information
gathered during SDP visits
•Feedback to other models 
through use of standardized 
assumptions and methods
•Identification and resolution
of generic industry modeling 
issues
Figure 1.  SPAR models - development history and feedback mechanisms
The SPAR model development program has expanded to include the following model types: 
Level 1 – Internal Events, full power operation 
Level 1 – Internal Events, shutdown operation 
Level 1 – External Events, (fires, floods, seismic, etc) 
Level 2 – Full spectrum, not limited to Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) 
Level 3 – Pending further evaluation 
The current objective of the SPAR model development program is to produce detailed plant-
specific probabilistic risk assessment tools that can be used by NRC staff analysts in the 
performance of their risk-informed regulatory activities. The current status of the SPAR model 
development activities, future development objectives and issues related to the development, 
verification and maintenance of the SPAR models are described in more detail in the following 
sections. 
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2 CURRENT STATUS 
The SPAR models are nearing completion of a detailed review process comparing SPAR 
model results, at the individual cut set level, with current utility PRA results. Of the 76 active 
SPAR models, 73 have had the comparison process completed (Revision 3.4+).  The remaining 
three models will be compared upon receipt of updated plant PRA results. This comparison effort 
consists of comparing the importance of analogous components (basic events) found in both the 
SPAR and PRA models. Those events found to have significant differences in their importance 
are examined to determine the reason for the difference. Once the origins of the differences are 
understood the SPAR models are modified if appropriate, or a basis for the difference 
enumerated in the SPAR model documentation.  Incorporation of current data (NUREG/CR-
6928 [2]) is also performed as part of the comparison process.  A typical plot of basic event 
importances from a Revision 3.4+ SPAR model compared with those from a utility PRA model is 
shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 2.  Scatter plot of basic event importances for a Revision 3.4+ SPAR model 
The coverage and detail of the SPAR models increase with each major revision. In addition 
to the 76 internal events full power models there are now thirteen models having some degree of 
modeling for external events (internal and external fires, severe weather, seismic and flooding). 
Six of the SPAR models include low power/shutdown logic. Five SPAR models also include 
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Level 2/LERF logic. With the exception of the Level 2 logic, all of the various analysis types 
associated with each plant are contained within a single integrated SPAR model. 
The detail of a SPAR model now approaches that of a typical utility PRA with 
approximately 1200 basic events, 150 fault trees and 15 event trees.  At the nominal SPAR 
truncation of 1E-13/year a typical SPAR model generates in the range of 50,000 cut sets.  The 
core damage frequencies (CDF) calculated in the current SPAR models average 4.1E-6/year for 
the boiling water reactors (BWRs) and 1.8E-5/year for the pressurized water reactors (PWRs).  
These values correlate closely with utility generated values of 5.3E-6/year for BWRs and 1.4E-
5/year for PWRs [4].  
3 ONGOING AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 
The SPAR Model Development Program continues to develop and improve risk analysis 
tools and capabilities to support the use of PRAs in the NRC’s risk-informed regulatory 
activities. The SPAR program is nearing completion of a major effort to perform detailed 
comparisons between the SPAR model results and the PRA results.  NRC and INL staff are 
working with industry representatives to resolve key outstanding technical issues common to 
both SPAR and utility PRA models. Resolution of these issues and incorporation of the 
resolutions into the SPAR models is expected to span the next 2-3 years.
The SAPHIRE code is the platform for development and quantification of the SPAR models. 
A major revision of the SAPHIRE code (8.0) is scheduled for release late this year. Among the 
more significant SAPHIRE code enhancements incorporated into the new version are 
streamlined and highly automated interfaces to support the significance determination process 
(SDP) and event assessments. Specific analyses modules to support the revised Level 2/LERF 
SPAR model development effort are planned as well. Improved quantification algorithms are 
being explored to support the analysis of the integrated SPAR models.  
3.1 Level 1 Models 
As previously noted the NRC and INL are working with industry representatives to develop 
practicable and technically sound guidance for PRA methodology applications for several key 
technical issues. This involves working with Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) on a 
cooperative research and development program. These key issues account for much of the 
differences between the SPAR model results and those of utility PRAs.  The three principal 
issues currently being addressed in this cooperative program are: 
1. Estimation of Support System Initiating Event (SSIE) frequencies using fault trees - In 
addition to addressing specific construction methodologies, environmental 
considerations relating to water quality of suction sources in open cycle cooling systems 
(i.e., service water) is also being addressed as part of this issue. 
2. Treatment of Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) events – Resolution of this issue will 
address multi unit effects, mission times (e.g., diesel generators), extended station 
blackout events, conditional LOOP modeling, operation of steam-driven and diesel-
driven equipment, etc. 
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3. Standard approaches for crediting injection following overpressure induced failures of 
containments in BWRs - Issues being addressed include containment depressurization 
rate assumptions, break locations and equipment susceptibilities, long-term injection 
with diesel-driven pumps, etc. 
Once a consensus resolution to these issues is achieved, the resolutions will be incorporated 
into the SPAR models. Peer review against ASME standards is then expected to follow 
incorporation of the consensus resolution approaches.
3.2 Shutdown Models 
Operating experience and various studies show that the risk from shutdown operation can be 
important.  To broaden their understanding of this risk, NRC is pursuing a program to model the 
risk of shutdown operations.  The current shutdown models are based on SPAR at power system 
fault tree logic that is modified as necessary and then combined with shutdown specific event 
trees. Currently there are five PWR and one BWR shutdown models.  These models are 
integrated with the corresponding at power SPAR models.  
The shutdown model logic is structured around plant technical specification operational 
modes. Risk from shutdown operations arising from Mode 4 (hot shutdown), Mode 5 (cold 
shutdown), and Mode 6 (refueling) for PWRs and Mode 4 (cold shutdown) and Mode 5 
(refueling) for BWRs is explicitly modeled. These operational modes are further delineated into 
plant operational states (POSs) based on factors such as time since shutdown; reactor coolant 
system (RCS) inventory and RCS pressure/pressure boundary status.  Consideration of these 
additional factors yields plant operational states with similar mitigating system applicability.  The 
end result of this assemblage is the definition and explicit modeling of nine POSs for PWRs and 
six POSs for BWRs. 
The results of these models indicate the risk of operation while shutdown, on a per hour 
basis, is comparable to operation at power.  Operator actions are found to dominate the shutdown 
risk.  During shutdown, many of the automatic initiations are secured and many of the systems 
are in atypical alignments.  Ongoing maintenance activities also reduce the redundancy of many 
of the mitigating systems.  Operator understanding of and response to, the atypical alignments 
and equipment status are critical during a shutdown. 
3.3 External Event Models 
The SPAR suite of models also includes thirteen external events models (internal & external 
fires, severe weather, seismic and flooding).  As with the other types of SPAR models, the 
external events models are integrated with, and build on, the at power Level 1 models. One 
notable difference between the external events models and all other SPAR model types is that the 
external events models are truly not independent analyses.  The scenarios and related equipment 
failures found in the PRAs are extracted and assimilated into the SPAR models.  This 
information is incorporated into the SPAR models via impact vectors in existing fault tree/event 
tree logic.  No independent analyses are performed when generating the external events models. 
In excess of 40 nuclear plants are currently transitioning to the performance based regulatory 
basis of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standard 805. The SPAR model 
development program, in conjunction with the SAPHIRE development program, is currently 
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evaluating the methods and potential SAPHIRE code changes necessary to incorporate this 
information into the SPAR models. 
3.4 Level 2/Large early Release Frequency (LERF) SPAR Models 
The current Level 2/LERF modeling efforts are focused on developing SPAR models for the full 
spectrum of Level 2 outputs, not just large early release (LER). This enhanced modeling effort 
will provide support for: 
? New reactor design assessments 
? The State of the Art Consequence Assessment (SOARCA)  
? Estimates of societal risk (latent cancers, land contamination, etc.) as well as individual 
early fatality risk 
? Incorporation of Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG)/Extensive Damage 
Mitigation Guidelines (EDMG) into SPAR models 
? Assessment of effectiveness of SAMG and EDMG measures 
? The assessment of advanced computation methods (Bayesian networks, data fusion 
techniques) in support of real time accident management 
There are two parts to the Level 2/LERF models: 1) Extension of the Level 1 models to include 
containment systems and 2) development of containment event trees to model containment 
phenomenology and accident progression. Modifications to the SAPHIRE 8 code have been 
introduced to support Level 2/LERF SPAR Model Development. Figure 2 illustrates the Level 
2/LERF SPAR model development approach. 
Enhanced SPAR 
Model Level 1 Containment Systems EPGs/SAMGs/EDMGs/HRA
SPAR Extended Level 1 Event Trees (PDS)
+
SPAR Model Level 2 
Containment 
Phenomena Event Tree 
(CPET)
CD PDS ST BinsIE
Lev 1 Lev 2 
PDS Grouping ST Binning
Decomposition 
 Event Trees 
Containment Systems EPGs/SAMGs 
Inputs
SAPHIRE Modifications 
Figure 2 – Overview of Level 2/LERF SPAR Model Development Process 
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3.4.1 Extended Level 1 SPAR Model Development 
The approach taken to modeling the systems and human actions that are important to 
accident progression following core damage (e.g., containment systems, support systems) that 
are important to defining the accident progression beyond core damage (i.e. containment 
accident progression) for assessing containment performance and radionuclide transport and 
release but are not considered significant to the determination of core damage (and hence are not 
included in the Level 1 core damage SPAR model) was to modify and/or extend the Level 1 
model to include these systems and human actions.  
For the extended Level 1 models new events were added as required (either event tree events 
or fault tree events) to support Level 2 accident progression analysis. These new events include 
those for containment systems such as containment sprays, Emergency Operating Procedures 
(EOPs) and SAMG operator actions, and systems utilized for severe accident management 
actions (e.g. firewater system).  Additional branches were also added under current existing 
(Level 1 core damage) event headings which are important to the Level 2 accident progression 
but were considered irrelevant for core damage determination.  Comparison of the success 
criteria for existing events in the Level 1 core damage event tree and with success criteria 
required for the Level 2 accident progression modeling needs was performed and events were 
added or modified as necessary to reflect different success criteria.  
Extending the Level 1 event trees to include containment systems and human actions 
provides the following advantages compared to other approaches (such as the use of “bridge 
event trees”). This approach allows all system dependencies to be considered in a uniform, 
integral manner and facilitates maintenance and updating of the Level 1 and Level 2 models in a 
consistent manner. Any plant modification that impacts any system or human action are 
simultaneously updated in both the Level 1 core damage models and Level 2 models 
3.4.2 Containment Event Tree (CET)/Decomposition Event Trees (DET) 
The containment event tree models generally consider the phenomenological aspects of 
accident progression. System status and human actions are only considered to the extent that the 
accident phenomena impact system availability or the need for, or probability of success of, 
human actions.  Hence, these event branching probabilities generally represent epistemic 
uncertainty rather than aleatory uncertainty as in the systems event trees. In this approach CETs 
are constructed with a limited number of event headings representing the most important 
phenomena that impact accident progression, containment failure and fission product release. 
Subsidiary event trees (DETs) are developed to support the quantification of each of the CET 
events, with the last event in the DET being the event of interest (CET event) and prior events in 
the DET representing events or other factors that have a causal influence on the likelihood of a 
particular state (branch) of the end event. The range of uncertainty in the individual events in the 
DET are represented in the form of a discrete probability distribution over the states (value 
ranges) of the event. In addition to probabilistic events, the DETs generally include deterministic 
events which represent dependencies on plant damage state conditions and on prior event branch 
decisions in the CET. Quantification of the CET/DETs involves marginalization of the joint 
probability distribution represented by the DET to obtain the branch probabilities for the end 
event in the DET and propagation (multiplication) of the DET end event (CET event) marginal 
probabilities.
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3.4.3 SAPHIRE 8 Modifications to Support Level 2/LERF SPAR Model development 
A substantial number of enhancements have been introduced into the SAPHIRE 8 code 
version to support the development and quantification of Level 2/LERF SPAR models. These 
include model changes to support the extended Level 1 modeling and to support the Containment 
Event Tree/Decomposition Event Tree approach for modeling containment phenomenology and 
accident progression. 
Modifications have been introduced that allow the flagging of identification of top event 
headings that have been added to support Level 2/LERF accident sequence progression and were 
not included in the Level 1 core damage model. Similarly, the capability of flagging and 
identification of new branches that have been added to existing Level 1 core damage events to 
support the Level 2 accident progression modeling is now supported. 
SAPHIRE 8 allows the graphical display of either the core damage (Level 1) event tree 
structure or the full extended Level 1 event tree structure with the additional top event headings 
and branching structure. The code also supports linking in fault trees as appropriate for core 
damage analyses or for quantification of the sequences through the extended Level 1 event tree. 
SAPHIRE 8 supports the use of graphical decision trees (logic diagrams) supported by if-
then-else inference rules for defining distinct plant damage states (PDS) groups and for assigning 
sequences to PDS groups. Similarly, the use of decision trees and rules are supported for defining 
distinct Source Term Bins and for assigning containment accident progression sequences to 
Source Term Bins. 
Code modifications have been introduced to support modeling Level 2 phenomena that 
impact accident progression using event trees (CETs) supported by subsidiary (decomposition) 
event trees (DETs) for detailed modeling and quantification. Two approaches to quantification of 
the CET/DETs are available: End-to-end (CET/DET) sequence quantification (multiplication of 
sequence branch probabilities) or marginalization for each end state probability in the DETs and 
quantification of the CET using the event marginal probabilities (multiplication of CET 
marginals). 
Five extended Level 1 SPAR models have been developed to date as well as three Level 
2/LERF (CET/DET SPAR) models. 
4 MODELING ISSUES 
Current SPAR modeling issues are both practical and technical. With the large number and 
varied model types, in conjunction with the numerous analysts involved in modeling, day-to-day 
modeling issues such as configuration control, consistency and efficiency in modeling are 
challenges to the SPAR program. The lack of regular and systematic feedback from the utilities 
regarding plant modifications is also problematic.  Technical issues include those previously 
mentioned modeling topics being cooperatively worked with the industry and specific SAPHIRE 
code limitations. 
Configuration control is difficult due to numerous and often concurrent modifications/ 
updates being performed on the models. The configuration control issue is exacerbated by 
assorted groups and organizations working concurrently on the models. The SAPHIRE website is 
the repository for current status information as well as the latest models. The SPAR model 
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program also relies heavily on the date and version number stamping features contained in 
SAPHIRE to ensure and implement configuration control.  Use of version control software that 
limits access to the model of record and provides a formal checkout procedure is being studied 
for future use.
The inclusion of varied analysis types within a single SPAR model frequently leads to 
multiple success criteria for the same function. For example, injection flow requirements for 
shutdown logic may be less restrictive than for at power logic. Modularizing fault tree logic at 
the train level provides the necessary flexibility to model these varying success criteria and 
remains an ongoing effort. 
Evolving SPAR model needs and advancements in the state of the art of the PRA industry 
occasionally out pace existing SAPHIRE features. One current SAPHIRE limitation is the 
allowance of only one set of rules (modifications that set house events and/or perform 
substitutions in sequence logic) per event tree sequence. This constraint necessitates extensive 
writing of unique/explicit rules for each sequence.  Soon to be released SAPHIRE version 8 will 
eliminate this restriction by allowing the use of inclusive overlapping sequence rules.  This 
improvement will greatly reduce the effort to construct external events models. The pending 
incorporation of support system initiating event fault trees has necessitated research into 
additional algorithms to calculate importance measures for components found in both mitigating 
as well as support system initiating event fault trees.
5 CONCLUSIONS  
The SPAR models in their current configuration and breadth are valuable tools used by the 
NRC to understand and evaluate risk associated with operation of nuclear power plants.  They 
are robust tools useful to the NRC for most PRA applications.  The standardized construction of 
these models (SAPHIRE quantification platform, failure and unavailability data, HRA 
methodology, modeling assumptions, level of detail, etc) provide a consistent platform from 
which to evaluate individual plant risk impacts as well as industry-wide issues.  The SPAR 
models are continuously improving in detail, accuracy and breadth of coverage.  These tools will 
continue to evolve to meet the emerging needs of the NRC and to reflect advancements in the 
state of the art of the PRA industry (PRA standards, analysis types, PRA quality, etc.).  
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